Corporate ownership and bribery by Das-Gupta, Arindam & Wu, Xun
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1131798
 1
 
Corporate Ownership and Bribery1 
 
 
Arindam Das-Gupta* and Xun Wu 
April, 2008 
 
LKY School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, 




We study how bribe behaviour by firms varies with ownership structure in the framework of 
agency theory. Firms with owner- or shareholder-managers have a lower propensity than 
professionally managed firms to bribe corrupt officials to obtain illegal gains in the cases of legal 
or regulatory violation, but when they do bribe, owner- or shareholder-managed firms pay larger 
bribes. In contrast, when bribes are extortionate, bribe propensity and size do not differ with 
ownership structure. These supply side results persist in equilibrium where the chances of 
inspection are endogenously determined. The extension of the agency model to bribery provides 
insights into the design of effective anti-corruption strategies.  
 
*Corresponding author. Tel.: 65-6516-4204; fax: 65-6468-6746.  
E-mail address: sppda@nus.edu.sg. 
                                                 
* We thank Scott Fritzen and participants at an academic seminar at the Lee Kuan Yew School in 
October, 2007. All errors are our responsibility. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1131798
 2
1. Introduction 
The corporate sector as an important source of corruption has been increasingly gaining 
recognition in the literature (Svensson 2003; Johnson et al.  2000). While firms have often been 
portrayed as victims of corruption, many corrupt exchanges are initiated by firms to avoid or reduce 
tax, to secure public procurement contracts, to bypass laws and regulations, and to block the entry of 
potential competitors (Rose-Ackerman 2002). Firms are perpetrators in these cases, and their 
willingness to engage in bribery directly contributes to prevalent corruption problems in many developing 
countries. Despite the important role played by the corporate sector in corruption the literature on 
corruption has mainly focused on the opportunities and incentives of bribe takes, or government 
officials, to engage in corrupt exchanges (Vogl  1998; Mishra  2005). Consequently anti-
corruption strategies also pay insufficient attention to the corporate sector as a source of 
corruption problems. 
Recent research has begun to shed light on the role of the corporate sector in corrupt 
exchanges. Abramo and Brasil (2003) find that one single firm’s propensity to bribe induces the 
same behavior in others, causing the system to deteriorate over time. Lambert-Mogiliansky et al 
(2007) report that business networks can facilitate corruption by enforcing bribes through 
punishments such as exclusion from the network. Competition among firms in corrupt exchanges 
is also a critical factor in affecting the nature and consequences of corrupt exchanges. Clark and 
Riis’ (2000) study of a competitive bribery model suggests that that a selfish, income-
maximizing bribee will exacerbate allocation inefficiency introduced by asymmetry of firms 
competing for government contracts. Most recently, attempts have also been made to model the 
behavior of multinational companies in influencing the level of corruption through international 
business transactions (Luo  2005; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, and Eden  2005; Celentani, Ganuza, 
and Peydro  2004).  
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This paper seeks to contribute to this literature by applying agency theory to study firms behavior 
in corrupt exchanges. In the existing literature, firms are often treated as a single decision-maker, while 
agency theory suggests that incentives facing different stakeholders in firms might differ. The owners (or 
principals) are interested in maximizing the return on their investments in the long run, while the 
managers (agents) might be motivated by their own personal interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Leland  
1998; Shankman  1999; Singh and Davidson III,  2003). The differences in time horizon and risk attitudes 
between owners and managers can affect how they deal with unethical actions such as bribery. Bribery 
may offer the managers the opportunity to cash in on any immediate upside movement from bribery 
activity while leaving the future potential risk and cost to the owners or shareholders. For example, 
securing a public project by bribing public officials may increase the value of cooperation in the short run, 
thus significantly increasing the compensation to the managers, but the firm may be held criminally liable 
for bribery involvement in years to come forcing shareholders to bear this risk. In this paper, we examine 
how firm ownership and control affect bribery by differentiating firms with owner- or shareholder-
managers and firms with professional managers.  
A key advantage such a distinction is that it helps to clarify differences between bribes 
that are extorted and bribes that “share the spoils” from a legal or regulatory violation between a 
violator and a corrupt official. From a policy perspective it is important to distinguish between 
corrupt exchanges which benefit bribe payers and cases where bribes are extorted, because in the 
presence of extortion, policy makers may be loath to further penalize bribe-payers.  
Two intuitively plausible propositions are formally demonstrated in our paper. First, if a 
violation makes an economic agent vulnerable to large bribe demands, the agent will be less 
likely to commit the violation.  This implies an inverse relation between bribe size and bribe 
propensity, across vulnerable and less vulnerable agents. In our analysis decision makers with 
long term interest in the firm, owners or part-owners, are more vulnerable to bribe demands than 
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professional managers. Second, if firms do not commit regulatory violations but are subject to 
extortion by government inspectors, then bribe supply behaviour will be identical across firm 
ownership types. Implications of these propositions for the design of effective anti-corruption 
policy are discussed later in the paper.  
The paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model is presented in Section 2 to 
show how differences in corporate ownership can be linked to differences in the supply of bribes 
which share the spoils from a regulatory violation between firms and corrupt government 
inspectors. In the analysis, decision makers with long term interest in the firm, owners or part-
owners, are taken to be more vulnerable to bribe demands than professional managers.  Section 3 
extends the sharing-of-spoils framework to extortionate bribes There it is demonstrated that 
ownership and control do not lead to differences in extortionate bribes. A simple model of 
demand for bribes by government inspectors is next developed, in Section 4. In Section 5 we 
study the equilibrium of the game between firms and the government inspector and show that 
differences in bribe behaviour persist in equilibrium if government inspectors use inspection 
strategies that maximize their expected utility from bribe income and if size distributions of 
different types of firms are similar. In Section 6, implications of our analysis for anti-corruption 
policy are discussed. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Corporate ownership, regulatory violations and sharing-of-spoils bribes 
The basic framework 
 A firm chooses whether to commit a regulatory violation, which, if detected, entails 
paying either a bribe or a penalty. The model's decision tree is in Figure 1. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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The violation may be one of several profitable illegal acts.2 If no violation is committed, 
the firm earns gross profit n + t, where n (“now”) is current profit and t  (“tomorrow”) is the 
present value of future profit. If the firm commits the violation, it makes additional current profit 
v. The violation is detected by a venal government inspector with probability p. If detected, the 
firm must pay either a bribe b in the current period or a penalty c (“caught”).3 Paying penalty 
also entails a reputation loss when the violation becomes publicly known (see Wu 2005 and also 
Beales, 2007). The reputation loss can either be with the firm’s clientele or because the firm is 
now marked as a violator by the government department. This adversely affects the firm’s future 
profitability. The proportion by which a damaged reputation decreases the firm’s future profits is 
denoted by r.  
Decision makers are taken to maximize expected personal profit. So to complete the 
model their profit shares must be specified. Their shares of current and future profit are denoted 
τ  and θ respectively, with θ ≤ τ  ≤ 1. Three “canonical” decision makers are considered:  
Case M: The professional manager receiving only a fixed salary (τ  = T > 0, θ = 0). While 
the professional manager may not explicitly receive a share of profits (τ), it is 
assumed that implicitly the manager’s pay is affected by exceptionally poor or good 
profit performance. 
Case I: The “incentivized manager” who explicitly receives a share of current profits and 
possibly a share of future profits (e.g. via a stock option) after ceasing to manage the 
                                                 
2 Examples are tax evasion, noncompliance with environmental regulations, undercutting the 
minimum wage. 
3 In section 3 below it will be assumed that the penalty is a positive function of the value of the 
violation v. 
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firm. The manager's future profit share is assumed to be no larger than the current 
profit share: θ  ≤ τ  < 1. 
Case O: The owner-manager (or shareholder manager) (τ  = θ  > 0). 
 After-bribe or after-penalty current profit is assumed to be the base for profit sharing: 
penalties or bribes are treated as business costs by managers who are not owners. This 
assumption is plausible if bribes cannot be observed by shareholders who are not involved in 
managing a firm. An extension in which personal liability for penalty exceeds the manager’s 
profit share is examined later. 
The manager's payoff and bribe 
 The manager's payoffs, U, can take on one of four values: These are 
Un = τ n + θt   if no violation is committed, 
Und = τ (n + v) + θt   with an undetected violation,  
Uc = τ (n + v  – c) + θrt  with a detected violation if a penalty is paid, and 
Ub = τ (n + v  – b) + θt  with a detected violation if a bribe is paid. 
 Clearly, the maximum bribe the manager will pay, bmax,  will leave the manager just as 
well off as paying the penalty (Uc = Ub). This implies that 
bmax = [θ(1 – r)t  + τ c] / τ , τ  > 0.               (1) 
The equilibrium bribe, b, is taken to be α[bmax – bmin]+ bmin, 0 < α  < 1. The standard assumption 
is made that the inspector’s opportunity cost of accepting a bribe determines the minimum bribe 
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that is acceptable, bmin.4 If bmax ≤ bmin, no bribery will occur. We restrict attention to the case of 
interest, where bmax > bmin. The proportion α  is a bargaining outcome, representing the 
inspector’s share of the "bribe surplus" [bmax – bmin]. With α < 1, a bribe is always preferable to 
paying a penalty. We use the shorthand notation B = (1-α)bmin, so that  
b = αbmax + B.          (2) 
Since B does not vary with ownership structure, from equation (1) the ordering of bribe 
amounts for the canonical cases M, I, and O is 
bM < bI ≤ bO.          (3) 
 As claimed, vulnerability leads to a larger sharing-of-spoils bribe payment5. 
The violation decision 
 The firm’s violation decision can now be examined. Assuming risk neutrality, the 
decision maker will commit a violation if and only if the expected personal return from the 
violation,  
pUb + (1 – p)Und, exceeds the personal return from no violation, Un. 
 Substituting the equilibrium bribe into Ub and solving, shows that the violation will be 
chosen if and only if violation benefits exceed a threshold, q. That is a violation will be 
committed if and only if  
                                                 
4 Bmin can reflect, first, the expected administrative penalty if bribe-taking is detected or, second, 
incentive pay if violation by a firm is detected by the inspector. For an analysis which 
distinguishes between the two types of incentives see Mookherjee and Png (1995). 
5 Differences can be larger if vulnerability increases the inspector’s bargaining power and allows 
the extraction of a greater share of bmax. Determinants of bargaining power are not studied in the 
paper. 
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v > q, where q ≡ p{α[θ(1 – r)t  + τc]/τ  + B} > 0.           (4) 
Equation (3) generates the same ordering for violation thresholds as (1) did for bribe size:  
qM < qI  ≤ qO.         (5) 
This implies that the propensity to pay bribes has exactly the opposite ordering as the bribe size 
ordering in (3). Intuitively, since vulnerability leads to larger bribes, it lowers the attractiveness 
of committing a violation in the first place.  
 
3. Incorporating extortion  
The model is now extended to incorporate extortionate bribes. Recent papers which study 
extortionate post-entry bribes are Mookherjee (1998), Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo (1999) and 
Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2000).  All three papers focus on tax evasion. Extortion in 
these papers arises if the government inspector over-reports the extent of violation by the 
inspected agent. Appealing to an adjudication institution to get the report overturned imposes 
transactions costs on the agent or may be subject to Type II error (a false negative) causing the 
over-report to be accepted as correct.6  Both  Hindricks, Keen and Muthoo and Marjit, 
Mukherjee and Mukherjee find supply differences related to income, specifically that extortion is 
regressive. Furthermore, if bribes can cause a tax official to refrain from harassment, richer 
taxpayers are likely to pay bribes and evade taxes while poorer taxpayers are likely to avoid 
                                                 
6 In both Mookherjee and Hindricks, Keen and Muthoo, performance-linked pay related to the 
difference between reported tax due and tax due as assessed by the inspector are necessary for 
extortion based bribes in equilibrium. However, transactions costs related to the filing of appeals 
against reports made by tax inspectors are sufficient for equilibrium extortion to occur in Marjit, 
Mukherjee and Mukherjee. 
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facing tax officials by not filing tax returns. We abstract from income differences across firms, 
focusing instead on differences related to corporate ownership and control structures. The 
extension here introduces the possibility of extortionate bribes even if no violation is committed. 
The extended decision tree is in Figure 2.   
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 In Figure 2, f represents a bribe paid as an “entry fee”. Examples are bribes paid to obtain 
a business license or to be allowed to put in a bid for a government contract. Since pre-entry 
harassment will be a sunk cost and have no influence on the agent’s subsequent decisions, it is 
ignored here. The rest of the decision tree extends Figure 1, by introducing a bribe component 
tied to the threat of harassment. That is, it is assumed that a firm selected for inspection can be 
made to incur a cost, h, if it does not pay a bribe, even if it does not commit a violation. This 
gives inspectors the power to extort a bribe, e, from them.7 To find the predicted bribe sizes and 
bribe propensities, proceed as in Section 2, working backwards. The six possible payoffs to 
agents in Figure 2 are summarized in Table 1. 
                                                 
7 It is also possible that harassment costs are wholly or partially imposed ex ante if an agent is 
chosen for inspection whether or not the firm pays a bribe to avoid further harassment.  That is, 
inspectors may indulge in a “show-of-force” to convince private agents that they are indeed 
capable of inflicting harm on the them if no bribe is paid. An example of this type of harassment 
is in the Ashutosh Anand case discussed in Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002), pp 46-51. 
Since such bribes are sunk costs once firms are selected for inspection, they are ignored here 
without qualitative loss. 
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1. Yes Yes Yes Ub = τ(n+v-b) + θt 
2. Yes Yes No Uc = τ (n+v-c-h) + θrt 
3. Yes No --- Und = τ (n+v) + θt 
4. No Yes Yes Une = τ (n-e) + θt 
5. No Yes No Unh = τ (n-h) + θt 
6. No No --- Unn = τ (n) + θt 
 
First consider the case of pure extortion. As before setting Ub = Uc, the maximum bribe 
can be found to be emax = h regardless of firm type. So provided h > bmin the equilibrium bribe 
will be 
e = αh + B.                            (6) 
Now consider the bribe and bribe threshold if the firm commits a violation discussed 
above. As before, the equilibrium bribe is taken to be αbmax + B where bmax is the value of b that 
solves Ub = Uc.  Allowing for the possibility of harassment modifies equation (1): 
bmax = [θ(1 – r)t  + τ (c+h)] /τ, τ  > 0                      (7) 
As can be seen, the bribe size ordering in equation (3) is unchanged, though the 
equilibrium bribe, b = αbmax + B, is larger since a portion is extorted under the threat of 
harassment.  
Now examine the violation threshold. This threshold, q, is now the value of v that solves 
pUb+(1-p)Und =  pUne + (1-p)Unn: 
q = pα[θ(1 – r)t  + τc]/τ  > 0.                        (8) 
As can be seen, the violation/bribe threshold ordering is also unchanged compared to the 
no harassment situation. However, the absence of the B in (8) compared to (4) shows that the 
propensity to commit regulatory violations is higher in the presence of extortion, even if bribes 
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partly reflect sharing-of-spoils. Intuitively, in the presence of extortion the minimum bribe 
inspectors will accept becomes a sunk cost in the event of an inspection whether or not there is a 
regulatory violation. 
The model, therefore, predicts a sharp qualitative difference between the impact of 
sharing-of-spoils and extortionate bribes both in terms of bribe size and bribe propensity 
rankings across firm types.  
 
4. The demand for bribes  
 The main reason for introducing the demand for bribes is to permit verification that the 
ranking of firm types by bribe propensity and size continue to hold if the behavior of government 
inspectors is made endogenous.  
The supply side is now simplified by assuming only two types of firms: pure M-firms and 
O-firms. On the other hand, heterogeneity across firms with the same ownership structure is 
introduced by allowing otherwise identical firms to vary according to their relative benefits from 
committing a violation. Inspectors can be viewed as controlling the probability of inspection by 
varying inspection frequencies of firms of different types. The description of their behavior 
comprises five assumptions. First, each inspector’s jurisdiction is assumed to consist of continua 
of firms of each type (M and O) with identical distributions. The cumulative distribution function 
of each type of firm in a jurisdiction, denoted F(v), is assumed to be differentiable and have 
support [0,V].8 The total number of firms of each type is W.  
                                                 
8 If the size distribution of violations differs greatly across firm types, for example, if large 
violators consist disproportionately of professionally managed firms, then the sharing-of-spoils 
bribe supply ranking in Section can be overturned, since inspectors will prefer to inspect 
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Second, inspectors are assumed to be able to observe the ownership structure of firms, 
but not the value of any violation a firm commits (or if it commits a violation at all) without 
inspecting the firm. However, once a firm is inspected, any violation is assumed to be correctly 
detected.  
Third, risk neutral inspectors are assumed to choose inspection probabilities to maximize 
their expected utility from bribe income. However, inspection effort is assumed to reduce an 
inspector’s utility according to the function η(P), where η' > 0 and η" > 0 and P is the number of 
firms inspected by the inspector. The number of firms of each type O or M selected for 
inspection are denoted by PO and PM, PO + PM = P .  The fourth assumption is that firms of each 
type are chosen randomly for inspection. Denoting the inspection (cum detection) probabilities 
(p in Sections 2 and 3) chosen by the inspector for each type of firm by  pM and pO, pM = PM/W, 
pO = PO/W.  Using this notation, qO and qM are given respectively by  
qO(pO)  = pObO = pO[α(1-r)t + αc + B] and              (9) 
qM(pM)  = pMbM = pM[αc + B].             (10) 
Given this structure, the expected utility of an inspector, Y  is given by  
Y = WpOE(bO,qO) + W pME(bM,qM) –  η(WpO+WpM),         (11) 
where  and  )](1][)1([)(])1([),( O
V
Oq
OO qFBctrVdFBctrqbE −++−=++−= ∫ αααα
 . )](1][[)(][),( M
V
Mq
MM qFBcVdFBcqbE −+=+= ∫ αα
The proportion of firms committing a violation will be 1 – F(qj), j = M, O.   
                                                                                                                                                             
relatively more large violators. Controlling for differences in the distributions of firms of 
different ownership types will be important in empirical testing the theory developed here. 
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Inspector can be viewed as playing a game with each firm in their jurisdictions, with the 
inspector’s strategy vector being the number of firms of each type (O or M) to inspect and the 
firm choosing whether or not to commit a violation. The equilibria of all of these bilateral games 
are completely characterized by the equilibrium violation thresholds, qO and qM.  However, this 
still leaves open the sequencing of moves by the two players. The fifth assumption made is that 
inspectors act as strategic leaders, taking into account the impact of their inspection frequency 
choice on violation decisions of firms and so the violation thresholds.9 
 
5. Equilibrium bribes and bribe thresholds 
 Intuitively, inspectors interested in maximizing their expected bribe income would prefer 
to inspect owner managed rather than professionally managed firms from whom they would 
receive larger bribes, other things equal. Going against this, inspectors would prefer to inspect 
groups with a higher propensity to commit a violation, to ensure that bribes can indeed be 
negotiated. It is shown here that the supply side ranking can be expected to persist in equilibrium 
given similar distributions of firms with different ownership structures. The analysis also reveals 
some unexpected properties of equilibrium bribes that are potentially relevant for anti-corruption 
policy, commented on in a later section.  
Sharing-of-spoils bribes 
                                                 
9 The case of “inexperienced inspectors”, who take as given expected bribes by M and O firms 
without taking into account the impact of their inspection frequency choice on violation 
thresholds, yields identical qualitative results and so is not considered further. Additional 
possible differences between inexperienced and experienced inspectors, such as in the number of 
firms they can inspect successfully per period will also leave the results qualitatively unaffected. 
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Equilibrium violation thresholds and inspection frequencies can be found by analyzing 
equation (11). First note that (11) can be rewritten as a function of qO and qM as 










Wqη   (12) 
On differentiating (12) partially with respect to PO and, separately, PM, it is evident that 
(12) will be maximized where  
[1 – F(qO) – qOF'(qO)]bO = [1 – F(qM) – qMF'(qM)]bM > 0.   (13) 
Since the left hand side of (13) is decreasing in qO  and the right hand side is decreasing in 
qM but bO > bM, clearly qM < qO in the equilibrium of the inspector-firm game. The ranking of 
firm types found from the analysis of bribe supply alone, persists in equilibrium.   
Extortionate and mixed bribes 
If firms do not commit violations so that bribes are purely extortionate, then, since bribes 
are identical across firms, equation (12) can only be used to determine the total number of firms 
an inspector will inspect per period. Inspectors will be indifferent between feasible random 
inspection strategies with this total number of firms. Furthermore, once firms choose to enter into 
business, they have no further strategic choices available. So all feasible inspection strategies in 
which the number of firms inspected maximize (12) are equilibria. 
With partly extortionate and partly sharing-of-spoils bribes, from (7) equilibrium bribes 
will be given by bO = {α [(1 – r)t +  c + h] + B} = α [(1 – r)t +  c] + e and bM ={α [c + h] + B} 
= α c + e. Violation thresholds will, from (8), be given by qO = pOα[(1 – r)t  + c] and  qM = 
pMαc. Expected bribes will now include the extortion component that is collected even if firms 
do not commit a violation and are now given by 
E(bO,pO)  =  bO[1 -F(qO)] + eF(qO) and          (14) 
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E(bM,pM )= bM[1 - F(qM)] + eF(qM).           (15) 
Equation (11) continues to describe the inspector’s expected utility from bribes.  Rewrite 
(11) substituting expressions for expected bribes as well as (6) and (8) to get 










Wqη        (16) 
Clearly, the bribe thresholds that maximizes Y continues to be described by (13). The 
only difference between the sharing-of-spoils and mixed bribe cases is in the values of pO and pM 
which maximize expected bribe income. Comparing equations (4) and (8) shows that equal 
thresholds imply a greater number of firms being inspected in the presence of extortion. 
6. Some policy implications 
The model generates some novel insights about the impact of corruption on economic 
and also administrative inefficiency. This is discussed directly below. Implications of sharing-of-
spoils bribes for technology choice are also briefly noted. Two types of anti-corruption policy 
issues which the paper sheds light on, the design of penalties and collection and interpretation of 
information to evaluate performance of government administration are then taken up. Following 
this a claim in the literature that governments could find it in their interest to condone extortion 
is re-examined through the lens of the framework developed here.  
Corruption and inefficiency 
There are at least two ways in which corrupt inspectors cause policy to detect violations 
to differ from that which a government interested in minimizing violations would implement. 
First, and most obvious, bribes decrease the expected penalty if a violation is detected compared 
to the case of incorruptible inspectors, since α < 1. Corruption, therefore, should increase the 
number of firms committing violations. Second, as shown in the example below, inspectors can 
have the incentive to conduct fewer inspections of owner-managed firms than a principal 
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interested in minimizing violations would want, further decreasing administrative effectiveness. 
This happens because too many inspections lead to lower expected bribe income whereas the 
greater deterrent effect of inspections on violations by O-firms makes for a higher marginal 
deterrent impact from inspecting O-firms, other things equal. If the additional cost this distortion 
imposes on O-firms is appreciable, this could bias corporate organization against professional 
management even when it is economically more efficient. 
An example that illustrates this bias is the case where F(.) is a uniform distribution on 
[0,V]. Then, using equations (9) and (10), equation (13) becomes 
[V2 – 2PObO]bO = [V2 – 2PMbM]bM.            (17) 





















+−=  In contrast, even if the total 
number of inspections and so the inspector’s effort level is unchanged, minimization of the 
number of violations is equivalent to choosing PO and PM  to maximize F(qO) + F(qM) subject to 
an unchanged total number of inspections. Since the rate of change of F(.) is greater with respect 
to PO than PM, the solution to this problem requires inspection resources to first be devoted to O-
firms (a corner solution). Only additional inspection resources, if the number of audits exceeds 
V, should be devoted to inspecting M-firms.  
Technology choice and sharing-of-spoils bribes 
 As argued by Wu (2005), managers whose rewards are linked to current but not future 
profits will prefer a technology that gives greater immediate payoff, even if it is less profitability 
than some other technology. In contrast, owner-managers would choose the more profitable 
technology. To examine how voluntary bribes can affect technology choice extend the basic 
model by introducing an alternative to the existing technology (with profits n and t) yielding 
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higher future profits t + y but lower current profits n – x. The new technology can be taken to be 
more profitable in that x < y.  
From (1) and (4) bribe size and threshold are both higher if the new technology is 
adopted. To study the impact of bribes, compare payoffs from the two technologies if a violation 
is committed and a bribe is planned to be paid in the event of an inspection. The expected payoff 
from choosing the inferior technology is Uinf  = pUb + (1 – p)Und : 
Uinf  = τ (n + v) + θt – αp[θ (1 – r)t + c] - B.             (18) 
The expected payoff with the superior technology, USup, is as in (18) except that n is replaced by 
(n – x) and t by (t + y). Thus   
UInf  – USup = τ x – θy + [pθyα(1 – r)].      (19) 
 Equation (19) shows that managers uninterested in future profits will continue to 
choose the inferior technology. However, paradoxically, if the manager’s payoffs depend on 
future profits (θ > 0), the attractiveness of the inferior technology decreases in the presence of 
bribes. The case of incorruptible inspectors, who report all violations they detect, implies α = 1. 
Equation (19) also shows that firms earning limited extra profits from the new technology who 
would choose the inferior technology when α = 1 may choose the superior technology when 
bribes are present since α < 1. This analysis, therefore, identifies a channel whereby bribes 
benefiting both payer and receiver can partially mitigate the real economic growth costs of 
corruption found in the literature.10 
Design of penalties 
Comparing equation (1) to equation (4), or (7) to (8), reveals an important difference 
between determinants of bribe propensity and bribe size: The probability of detection affects the 
                                                 
10 See, for example,  Mauro, 1995. 
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propensity to pay bribes or, equivalently, to commit a violation, but has no impact on the bribe 
size. On the other hand the penalty for regulatory violations affects both the bribe amount 
(positively) and the bribe propensity (negatively).  In the current context, therefore, while the 
“Becker conundrum” which points to penalties and detection probabilities being perfect 
substitutes in deterring violations continues to hold, the detection probability unlike penalty for 
violations does not affect the size of bribes. Second, corruption penalties for inspectors11 (which 
influence the inspector’s minimum bribe and so B) affect bribes and violations in a very different 
way if inspectors also have the power to extort bribes. From equation (8) these can be seen to 
affect the bribe size but not the propensity. This suggests that optimal policy design to deter both 
violations and bribes should determine both types of penalties jointly and also, if this can be 
controlled, the probability of detection. 
A further inference concerns personal liability for penalty. The results in the sharing-of-
spoils model depend on penalties or bribes being treated as a business cost, implying that the 
manager's penalty share and profit share are identical. What if the manager were fully liable for 
the penalty? This possibility can be used here to distinguish between firms managed by 
incentivized managers (Case I) and firms managed by part-owners of widely held firms. The 
latter can be modeled by letting the manager's share of penalty, π, exceed manager’s profit share 
if θ = τ  < 1. The manager’s share of penalty now becomes πc. In this case (1) and (3) show that 
the bribe size and violation threshold will be higher than bO and qO respectively.  This result can 
be contrasted with the limited application of personal liability penalties in practice: Cases where 
personal liability penalties are imposed are still newsworthy.12 
                                                 
11 Or incentive pay based on reported violations. 
12 See, for example, Beales (2007), and Hughes and Wright (2007). 
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Information to evaluate administration performance 
This discussion of penalty design suggests that the average bribe or the size distribution 
of bribes are not useful indicators of administrative effectiveness in deterring violations, since 
the vulnerability of firms, the bargaining strength of inspectors and the power of inspectors to 
extort bribes all affect bribe size. Only independent surveys of the incidence of regulatory 
violations, if these can be conducted, can permit performance to be assessed.13 
Do governments condone extortion? 
 As in Mookherjee (1998) and above, extortion induces inspectors to undertake a greater 
number of inspections than when extortion is absent. In Mookherjee (1998) government revenue 
is affected positively by the additional effort tax inspectors put in. Therefore, the government 
may have the incentive to look the other way when inspectors indulge in extortion. In contrast 
the analysis in this paper suggests that, paradoxically, this has no impact on the propensity to 
commit violations but only affects bribe size. In the context of tax evasion, the model here does 
not support a positive link between extortion and government revenue since the propensity to 
commit a violation is higher when extortion is present. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
In contrast to some earlier work (Mookherjee and Png  1995), the bargaining parameter, 
α, was seen above to have real effects through its impact on the violation threshold rather than 
                                                 
13 The model’s prediction that no violations are ever reported is merely a convenient application 
of Occam’s razor. To get around this it could have been assumed that a given fraction of detected 
violations are reported.  
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merely affecting the distribution of spoils between the violator and the inspector. Therefore, 
empirical work to study the determinants of the bribe threshold may prove useful. 
An attempt is made, in this paper, to the study of the supply side of bribes by examining 
supply differences across firms with different corporate ownership and control structures. In this 
context it is established that bribe size and bribe propensity will generally be inversely related 
across firms with different ownership and control structures. Our examination also suggests an 
additional microeconomic channel for the observed negative effect of corruption on economic 
growth, via increased violations and possibly inefficient choice of firm ownership and control 
structure. On the other hand, the paper also identifies a new channel through which mutually 
beneficial and voluntary bribes may induce more widespread adoption of new technology. The 
analysis, furthermore, has implications for the design of effective anti-corruption policy. In 
particular, supplier and administrative penalties play distinct roles in curbing corruption and so 
should be jointly considered when designing anti-corruption policy.  
 21
References 
Abramo, C. W., and T. Brasil. 2003. “Prevention and detection in bribery-affected public 
procurement.” 
 
Beales, R., 2007, Survey shows few checks for bribery, Financial Times, Asia print edition, 
April 13, 2007, 18. 
 
Celentani, M., J. J. Ganuza, and J. L. Peydro. 2004. “Combating Corruption in International 
Business Transactions.” Economica 71(283):417-448. 
 
Chattopadhyay, S. and A. Das-Gupta 2002. The Compliance Cost of the Personal Income Tax 
and its Determinants, New Delhi: NIPFP. Available at: 
http://planningcommission.gov.in/reports/sereport/ser/stdy_prsnltax.pdf. 
 
Clark, D. J., and C. Riis. 2000. “Allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game.” Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 42(1):109-124. 
 
Fisman, R. and J. Svensson, 2007, Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm 
level evidence, Journal of Development Economics, 83, 63-75. 
 
Hennigan, Michael (2006) Global corruption rampant: Corporate entertainment the new bribery, 
Finfacts Ireland Business News, Feb 11, 2006, 
http://www.finfacts.com/irelandbusinessnews/publish/article_10004848.shtml, accessed 
Oct 7, 2007. 
 
Hindriks, J, M. Keen and A. Muthoo, 1999, Corruption, extortion and evasion, Journal of Public 
Economics, 74, 395-430. 
 
Hughes, S. and T. Wright, 2007, “Monsanto ex-official settles bribe charges, Wall Street Journal 
Asia, March 9, 4. 
 
Jensen, M., and W. Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, 
and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3(4):305-360. 
 
Johnson, S. et al. 2000. “Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism.” 
Journal of Public Economics 76(3):495-520. 
 
Lambert-Mogiliansky, A., M. Majumdar, and R. Radner. 2007. “Strategic analysis of petty 
corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats.” Journal of Development Economics 
83(2):351-367. 
 




Luo, Y. 2005. “An Organizational Perspective of Corruption.” Management and Organization 
Review 1(1):119-154. 
Marjit, S., V. Mukherjee and A. Mukherjee, 2000, Harassment, corruption and tax policy, 
European Journal of Political Economy, 16, 75-94.  
 
Mauro, P., 1995, Corruption and growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 681-712. 
 
Mishra, A. 2005. The Economics of Corruption. Oxford University Press. 
 
Mookherjee, D., and I. P. L. Png. 1995. “Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be 
Compensated?.” The Economic Journal 105(428):145-159. 
 
Mookherjee, D., 1998, Incentive reforms in developing country bureaucracies: lessons from tax 
administration, In B. Pleskovic and J. E. Stiglitz, Eds, Proceedings of the Annual World 
Bank Conference on Development Economics (Washington D.C.: The World Bank), 103-
125. 
 
Rodriguez, P., K. Uhlenbruck, and L. Eden. 2005. “Government Corruption and the Entry 
Strategies of Multinationals.” The Academy of Management Review 30(2):383-396. 
 
Rose-Ackerman, S. 2002. “Grand Corruption and the Ethics of Global Business.” Journal of 
Banking and Finance 26(9):1889-1918. 
 
Shankman, N. A. 1999. “Reframing the Debate Between Agency and Stakeholder Theories of 
the Firm.” Journal of Business Ethics 19(4):319-334. 
 
Singh, M., and W. N. Davidson III. 2003. “Agency Costs, Ownership Structure and Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms.” Journal of Banking and Finance 27(5):793-816. 
 
Svensson, J. 2003. “Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of 
Firms.” Technology 207. 
 
Svensson, J., 2003, "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of 
Firms", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 207-30. 
 
Vogl, F. 1998. “The Supply Side of Global Bribery.” Finance & Development 35(2):30-33. 
 
Wu, Xun. 2005. “Corporate Governance and Corruption: A Cross-Country Analysis.” 







Figure 1. Violation and bribe decisions 
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Figure 2. Violation and bribe decisions with extortion 
 
